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Up Against a Great Wall: The Fight Against
Intellectual Property Piracy in China
Michael Yeh
The technological advances of the past decade have pushed
intellectual property (IP) piracy to the forefront of international
politics.1 In Beijing, Windows '95 sells for four dollars and mov-
ies such as Forrest Gump and Jurassic Park sell for six dollars. 2
China currently has the capacity to produce up to ninety million
illicit CDs a year, yet its domestic market can only absorb five
million CDs.3 Consequently, China exports CDs and other pi-
rated products to Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, Latin America,
and even North America. 4 China's continued failure to enforce
its IP laws has prompted American industrial interests to lobby
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to impose sanc-
tions of more than $1 billion on Chinese imports into the United
States.5
The United States uses trade sanctions as its primary
weapon in the fight against piracy because many foreign coun-
1. Intellectual property is usually divided into three categories: copy-
rights, patents, and trademarks. A copyright is "the exclusive right held by the
author or developer of an original work of authorship to make copies of such
work and utilize them for commercial purposes." STEPHEN R. ELIAS, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW DICTIONARY 42 (1985). Works that receive copyright status
in the United States and many other countries include: literary works, audiovi-
sual works, computer software, graphic works, musical arrangements, and
sound recordings. Id. at 43.
A patent is a "right of protection granted to an inventor which can be used
to exclude others from manufacturing, selling or using his or her invention as it
is specifically described in the patent." Id. at 146.
A trademark is "a word, phrase, logo, or other graphic symbol used by a
manufacturer or merchant to distinguish his or her line of products from the
products of others." Id. at 107.
2. Amy Borrus et al., Counterfeit Disks, Suspect Enforcement: China's
Feeble Piracy Crackdown Puts Clinton in a Quandary, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 1995,
at 68.
3. Intellectual Property: U.S. Looking for Proof that China is Clamping
Down on Pirated Disks, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 193 (Feb. 7, 1996).
4. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 TRADE POLICY AGENDA
AND 1994 ANNuAL REPORT 58 (1994) [hereinafter 1995 TRADE POLICY].
5. Helene Cooper & Marcus W. Brauchli, U.S. Threatens Sanctions
Against China in Reprise of Last Year's Copyright Fight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
1996, at A2.
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tries depend on the U.S. market for exports.6 In 1988, Congress
passed Special 301, mandating the USTR to use trade sanctions
or other limits on market access to retaliate against inadequate
protection of IP rights.7 In recent years, the United States has
frequently employed Special 301 against countries such as In-
dia, Taiwan, and China.8 While the United States has success-
fully used its economic clout in the past, the strategy appears to
have failed with regard to China.
This Note considers why the strategy of using economic in-
fluence as leverage failed to establish an effective IP regime in
China. Part I of this Note details the current IP strategy of the
United States and the events leading up to the crisis with
China. Part II discusses potential reasons why the current use
of strong-arm tactics by the United States has failed to establish
an effective IP regime in China, and finally, Part III presents an
alternative strategy that is based on positive economic
incentives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. SPEcIAL 301
Special 301 is part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988.9 It allows the United States to use the threat
of unilateral retaliation to persuade and motivate trading part-
ners to reform inadequate IP acts, policies, or practices. 10 In im-
plementing Special 301, the USTR creates three lists-the
priority foreign country list, the priority watch list, and the
watch list." Priority foreign countries are countries that have
the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices in the
area of IP and have failed to enter into good faith negotiations or
to make significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotia-
tions.12 Countries on the priority watch list are similar to prior-
6. Y. Kurt Chang, Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting
United States Intellectual Property in Foreign Countries, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 206, 212 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Ann Main, Pursuing U.S. Goals Bilaterally: Intellectual Property and
'Special 301,' Bus. AM., Sept. 25, 1989, at 6.
9. Id.
10. Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy: Analysis of the Prob-
lem and Suggestions for Protection of U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 599,
614 (1995).
11. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301" Its Requirements, Im.
plementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 267 (1990).
12. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
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ity foreign countries except these countries are engaging in good
faith negotiations, or are making significant progress in negotia-
tions. 13 Countries on the watch list, the least serious of the
three categories, warrant attention because particular problems
exist with respect to the protection or enforcement of IP rights. 14
In determining the Special 301 lists, the USTR considers
data from the Register of Copyrights, the Commissioner of Pat-
ents and Trademarks, and the National Trade Estimates. 15
Special 301 requires the USTR to release the lists each spring,
within thirty days of the release of the National Trade Esti-
mates.' 6 After releasing the lists, the USTR has thirty days to
initiate an investigation into the acts, policies, or practices of
priority foreign countries.' 7 Special 301 allows the USTR six
months to complete the investigation and to negotiate a solu-
tion.' 8 If the issues remain unresolved, the USTR may take any
or all of the following actions: (1) suspend trade benefits; (2) im-
pose duties or other restrictions; and (3) enter into binding
agreements committing the priority foreign country to stop the
offending practices or to compensate the United States. 19
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL 301
The United States has successfully used its economic clout,
often under Special 301, to obtain agreements that oblige foreign
countries to implement IP laws, to amend existing laws, or to
enforce laws.20 However, many of these new laws are simply
13. USTR Fact Sheets on Super 301 Trade Liberalization Priorities and
Special 301 on Intellectual Property, Released May 25, 1989, 6 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) 715, 719 (May 31, 1989).
14. 1995 TRADE POLICY, supra note 4, at 98.
15. 19 U.S.C-A. § 2242(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995). The National Trade Esti-
mates are annual reports published by the USTR that identify and analyze
acts, policies, or practices of foreign countries that constitute significant barri-
ers to or distortions of American exports. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2241(a)(1) (West Supp.
1995). The reports also estimate, if feasible, the value of additional goods and
services of the United States that would have been exported had the acts, poli-
cies, or practices not been in place. Id.
16. The USTR must identify violating countries within thirty days of the
release of the National Trade Estimates. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242(a) (West Supp.
1995). However, a priority foreign country may be designated at any time. 19
U.S.C.A. § 2242(c) (West Supp. 1995).
17. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
18. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
19. Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term
Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRAcusE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 29, 38 (1995).
20. Keith M. Rockwell, U.S. Laws Seen as Successful in Curbing Patent
Piracy, J. COM., Mar. 10, 1993, at 3A, available in WESTLAW, JOC database.
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paper tigers that are part of an annual spring-time flurry of ac-
tivity associated with the USTR's announcement of the Special
301 lists.21 Once the threat of retaliation passes, foreign coun-
tries tend to do little in terms of follow-up or enforcement. 2 2
China's early failure to abide by the IP agreement it signed with
the United States in February, 1995, is the most visible example
of this problem. 23 Aside from China, the United States has also
had IP problems with numerous other countries, including India
and Taiwan.2 4
1. India
The United States first named India a priority foreign coun-
try in 1991 because its laws provided inadequate patent protec-
tion for pharmaceutical and chemical products.2 5 Under India's
IP laws, items such as food, medicine, or drugs produced by
chemical processes could not be patented. 26 India also failed to
protect biotechnological inventions, methods of agriculture, and
processes for treatment of humans, animals, or plants.2 7 Other
The United States concluded bilateral IP agreements with a number of impor-
tant trading partners, including South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Russia, and Poland. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 5 U.S. DEPT. ST.
DISPATCH 126 (1994).
21. Francis S.L. Wang, Taming the Infringers: 'Special 301 Process" Fos-
ters Copyright and Trademark Protection, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1993, at S1.
22. Nations Act on Intellectual-Property Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1993,
at Bll.
23. Maggie Farley & James Gerstenzang, China Piracy of U.S. Products
Surges Despite Accord, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al. For a discussion of
China's failure to enforce this agreement, see infra notes 61-66 and accompany-
ing text.
24. The United States named India a priority foreign country in 1991,
1992, and 1993 and Taiwan in 1992. Intellectual Property: Kantor Singles Out
Brazil, India, Thailand for Special 301 Designation, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
726 (May 5, 1993); Intellectual Property: U.S., Taiwan Reach Key Agreement on
Patent, Trademarks, Copyrights, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001 (June 10, 1992).
25. Intellectual Property: USTR Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand as Worst
Intellectual Property Offenders, 9 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 784 (May 6, 1992).
26. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 144-45 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
NTE]. India's laws recognize patent protection for processes, but not for prod-
ucts. Intellectual Property: India's Patent Law Changes Lapse in Absence of
Parliament's Approval, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 613 (Apr. 5, 1995). This dis-
tinction allows one to manufacture a product as long as the process used is
slightly different from the protected process. Id.
27. 1995 NTE, supra note 26, at 145.
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items of contention included India's broad compulsory licensing
provisions and its failure to enforce already existing IP laws. 28
In 1993, after a seven-month long investigation into India's
IP practices, the United States retaliated by revoking duty-free
privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).29
The revocation affected approximately $80 million in phar-
maceuticals, chemicals and related products.30 During 1993,
the issue of pharmaceutical and chemical patents remained un-
resolved, but India improved its laws in the areas of copyright
and trademark protection. 31 As a result of these changes, the
USTR moved India down to the priority watch list in 1994.32
India's failure to join the Paris Convention and to establish
pharmaceutical and chemical patent protection continues to be a
concern of the United States.3 3 In 1995, India promulgated an
28. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 NATIONAL TRADE EsTi-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 105 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 NTE].
Compulsory licensing occurs when the government requires a patent or copy-
right holder to allow others to produce the protected product. A. JOHN MICHEL
& KURT KELMAN, DICTIONARY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 168 (1954). India's
stringent compulsory licensing provisions often render patents and copyrights
meaningless. 1991 NTE, supra, at 104.
29. John Maggs, U.S. to List Nations that Fail to Protect Intellectual Prop-
erty, J. COM., Apr. 30, 1993, at 5A, available in WESTLAW, JOC database. The
GSP is a system under which industrialized countries such as the United States
give preferential tariff treatment to manufactured goods imported from certain
less developed countries. The Language of Trade, Bus. Am., July 1994, at 6.
30. 1995 NTE, supra note 26, at 144.
31. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1993 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 123 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 NTE].
The amended copyright law provides for: rental rights for video cassettes; pro-
tection for works transmitted by satellite, cable, or other means; and limited
judicial discretion with respect to the level of penalties imposed on copyright
pirates. 1995 NTE, supra note 26, at 145.
India also established the Copyright Enforcement Advisory Council and
announced that it would accord national treatment for the use of trademarks
owned by foreign proprietors. 1993 NTE, supra, at 123. The council is respon-
sible for policy development and coordination, initiating a program for training
police officers and prosecutors, and the compilation of data on copyright of-
fenses on a nation-wide basis. Id.
32. USTR Announcement on Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII)
and Intellectual Property Protection (Special 301), 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
791, 795 (May 3, 1995).
33. 1995 NTE, supra note 26, at 144.
The Paris [Convention was] signed in Paris in 1883 and last revised in
1967. Under the Convention, each member State must accord the
same protection to the inventions, trademarks and other subject mat-
ter of industrial property of the nationals of the other member States
as it accords to those of its own nationals. The Convention also pro-
vides certain facilities to foreigners; for example, it allows them, with-
out losing their claim to novelty, to file their applications for patents up
1996] 507
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ordinance allowing patents on pharmaceutical products. 34 The
ordinance lapsed, however, when economic nationalists in the
Indian Parliament refused to approve the bill within the re-
quired six-week period.35 Aside from India's parliamentary poli-
tics, the Indian belief that drugs and medicines should be in the
public domain also hinders the establishment of patent protec-
tion for pharmaceutical and chemical products.3 6
2. Taiwan
In 1992, the United States named Taiwan a priority foreign
country because of its widespread cable television and video
piracy, exports of pirated software and CDs, and inadequate en-
forcement of IP laws.3 7 On June 5, 1992, less than two months
after being named a priority foreign country, Taiwan signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States
concerning the protection of IP rights.38 Under the MOU, Tai-
wan agreed to improve copyright protection of recordings, video,
and software and to bring its patent and trademark laws up to
internationally recognized standards. 39 Taiwan complied with
the MOU by passing a Bilateral Copyright Agreement and a
Cable Television Bill. 40 Taiwan also instituted a Comprehen-
sive Action Plan for Protection of IP Rights, which calls for the
establishment of a central agency for the coordination of IP
to a year after first filing in the country of origin. It contains provisions
concerning the conditions under which a State may license the use of a
patented invention in its own territory if, for example, the owner of the
patented invention does not exploit it in such territory.
Alison Butler, The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: What
is at Stake?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis 34, 43 (Nov.-Dec. 1990) (citing
WIPO, GENERAL INFORMATION, 1990).
34. India Modifies Patent Laws, J. PROPRIETARY RTs., Mar. 1995, at 33.
35. Intellectual Property: India's Patent Law Changes Lapse in Absence of
Parliament's Approval, 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 613 (Apr. 5, 1995). The pas-
sage and implementation of the bill is required as part of India's accession to
the WTO. India's WTO Patent Bill Fails in Parliament, Marketletter, Apr. 10,
1995, available in WESTLAW, MKTLTR database.
36. Intellectual Property: Patent Protection Talks With India Not Close to
Breakthrough, Official Says, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1223 (July 15, 1992). In
1982, Indira Ghandi stated "the idea of a better-ordered world is one in which
medical discoveries will be free of all patents and there will be no profiteering
from life and death." Peggy E. Chaudhry & Michael G. Walsh, International
Property Rights: Changing Levels of Protection Under GATT, NAFTA and the
EU, 30 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 80, 88 (1995).
37. Intellectual Property: U.S., Taiwan Reach Key Agreement on Patent,
Trademarks, Copyrights, 9 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001 (June 10, 1992).
38. Chang, supra note 6, at 218.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 218-19.
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rights protection. 41 In 1993, the USTR praised Taiwan for its
prompt compliance in the areas of copyrights, cable television,
and trademark protection and removed it from the priority for-
eign country list.42
While Taiwan appears to be a model of how the U.S. IP
strategy should work, a closer look reveals that Taiwan actually
resisted American pressure to establish an effective IP regime
when it was dependent on American economic and military sup-
port.43 Taiwan only acted after its domestic industries began to
feel the costs of piracy. 44 The timing of Taiwan's actions sug-
gests that foreign countries are more sensitive to the cost of
piracy on their domestic industries than to American pressure.
3. China
In recent years, China has replaced Japan as the source of
high-profile trade controversies, and IP issues top the list.4 5 The
United States first named China a priority foreign country in
1991.46 At the time, the United States desired patent and copy-
right protection within the standards of the Paris and Berne
Conventions. 47 In the area of copyright protection, the United
41. Id.
42. Trade Agency Reports Advances in Protecting Intellectual Property,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1993, at B2; Intellectual Property: Kantor Singles Out Bra-
zil, India, Thailand For Special 301 Designation, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 726
(May 5, 1993).
43. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 108
(1995).
44. Frankie Fook-Lun Leung, Tradition of Copying in China Fuels the
Piracy of Intellectual Property, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at D2. Piracy helped
Taiwan's business people understand that stiffer IP regulations also provide
them with better protection. Yvonne Yuan, Taiwan Takes On Its Pirates,
WORLD PRESS REV., Sept. 1994, at 49.
45. Clinton Likely to Shun New Initiatives that Could Stir GOP, 13 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 24, 1996) (discussing China's continued failure to de-
velop and enforce an effective IP regime).
46. Morton David Goldberg & Jesse M. Feder, China's Intellectual Property
Legislation: New Copyright Regulations Leave Much to be Desired, CHINA Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 8.
47. China: U.S. Takes First Steps On Sanctions Against Chinese Goods
Under Special 301, 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1754 (Dec. 4, 1991). For a descrip-
tion of the Paris convention, see supra note 33.
The Berne [Convention was] signed in Berne in 1886 and last revised
in 1971. Under the Convention, each member State must accord the
same protection to the copyright of the nationals of the other member
States as it accords to that of its own nationals. The Convention also
prescribes some minimum standards of protection; for example, that
copyright protection generally continues throughout the author's life
and for fifty years thereafter. It includes special provisions for the ben-
efit of developing countries.
1996] 509
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States was concerned with China's failure to treat computer
software as literary work, a provision that allows non-commer-
cial entities to copy software, and China's failure to protect liter-
ary work unless it was first published in China.48 In the area of
patent protection, China only protected pharmaceutical and
chemical processes, whereas the United States desired protec-
tion of products as well. 49
Initially, Chinese officials argued that the United States
should not expect China, a developing country, to comply with
the IP standards of the United States, a highly industrialized
nation.50 Chinese officials also argued that because pharmaceu-
tical and chemical products are often critical to sustaining
human life, industrialized countries have an obligation to share
these advances with developing countries.5 '
After nine months of negotiations, China and the United
States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in
1992.52 In the MOU, China agreed to extend patent protection
to pharmaceutical and chemical products and to join the Berne
Convention by October 15, 1992.53 In addition, China agreed to
treat computer software as literary work, with a protection term
of fifty years.5 4
Although China joined the Berne Convention and began
promulgating IP laws,55 China failed to enforce these new
laws.5 6 As a result, in 1994, the United States named China a
priority foreign country for the second time in four years . 7 The
United States desired: (i) effective measures to immediately cur-
Butler, supra note 33, at 43 (citing WIPO, GENERAL INFORMATION, 1990).
48. Vanessa Lide, USTR Targets China, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1991,
at 7.
49. Id. Product protection is important in the pharmaceutical and chemi-
cal industries because process protection does not prevent competitors from pro-
ducing the same product through a slightly different process. See supra note 26
(explaining the product/process problem in India).
50. Intellectual Property: China Calls Designation Under Special 301 "Un-
acceptable," Warns Trade Ties Endangered, 8 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 644 (May
1, 1991).
51. Id.
52. China: U.S.-China Intellectual Property Accord Ends Threat of U.S. Re-
taliatory Duties, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 139 (Jan. 22, 1992).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Lee M. Sands, IPR Watchdogs, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 16-
17.
56. Arthur Wineburg, The Close of Round Two, CHINA Bus. REV., July-
Aug., 1995, at 20-21.
57. Sands, supra note 55, at 17.
510 [Vol. 5:503
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tail IP piracy, (ii) the creation of an IP enforcement regime, and
(iii) improved market access for IP products.58 On February 4,
1995, after twenty months of negotiations, the USTR threatened
to impose 100% tariffs on $1.08 billion of Chinese imports into
the United States effective February 26, 1995, if outstanding IP
issues were not resolved.5 9 In the end, China and the United
States reached an agreement just before the February 26 dead-
line, and avoided a trade war.60 In this agreement, China
agreed to shut down its twenty-nine illicit CD factories, to ease
restrictions on Chinese imports of legally produced audiovisual
products, to improve border enforcement against the import and
export of articles violating IP rights, and to establish a system of
permits and licenses for the production of audiovisual and
software products.61
One year after the signing of the agreement, it remains
largely unenforced.6 2 Not only has China failed to shut down its
illicit CD factories, but it has allowed new ones to open.6 3 One of
the more flagrant violations involves the Chinese Ministry of
State Security, which opened and began to operate an illicit CD
factory after the signing of the agreement.64 Furthermore, the
58. Id. at 17-18.
59. 1995 TRADE POLICY, supra note 4, at 58.
60. Wineburg, supra note 56, at 20.
61. Id.
62. Borrus et al., supra note 2, at 68. Representatives of American compa-
nies describe the situation as being "on the one yard line, with ninety-nine
yards to go." Id. China has acted against some retailers of pirated goods. The
government recently raided 3,177 shops that sell pirated products and confis-
cated 1.9 million CDs, 752,000 audio and videotapes, 45,000 books, and 37,000
software programs. Id.
The courts have also begun to change. A Beijing court recently awarded
Walt Disney $27,405 in a copyright infringement case. Beijing Court Awards
Disney in Copyright Case, AsIAN WALL ST. J., May 19, 1995, at 4. The decision
was the first victory for an American company since the United States and
China signed the 1992 MOU. Id.
Despite the flutter of enforcement activity, piracy continues because China
has failed to address the source of the problem - the producers of pirated
goods. Borrus et al., supra note 2, at 68. China has also failed to implement a
title verification system and an effective customs regime. Intellectual Property:
U.S. Sets Deadlines for China for Intellectual Property Compliance, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 48 (Dec. 6, 1995).
63. Kennedy Maize, Piracy Enforcement Problems in China, NEWSBYTES
NEWS NETwoRK, Sept. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, NEWSBYTE database.
Of the 29 CD factories, International Intellectual Property Alliance officials
knew of only one, the Shenfei factory, that had stopped producing pirated disks.
Kathy Chen, China is Faulted by U.S. Group on Piracy Pact, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 1995, at A10.
64. Maize, supra note 63.
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drop in the price of pirated goods indicates that the 1995 IP
agreement has not affected the production of such goods.65
While inadequate enforcement is the primary problem in
China, there are other contributing factors. The rudimentary
Chinese judicial system is ill-equipped to handle IP cases.6 6 In
addition, the market reforms of the late 1980's granted officials
in the coastal provinces the power to control their own economic
affairs, making it more difficult for authorities in Beijing to es-
tablish an IP regime.67 Further complicating the problem of ef-
fective enforcement is the fact that many government officials
have an economic interest in allowing or even encouraging IP
violations.68
At a broader level, China's political culture also affects ef-
forts to establish an effective IP regime. 69 Traditionally,
Chinese society has emphasized the Confucian vision of the im-
portance of a "shared and still vital past."70 This vision is pre-
mised on the belief that the essence of human understanding
has been discerned by "those who have gone before." 71
Consequently:
[t]he replication of particular concrete manifestations of such an en-
deavor by persons other than those who first gave them form never
carried, in the words of the distinguished art historian and curator
Wen Fong, the "dark connotations... it does in the West.".. . On the
contrary, in the Chinese context, such use was at once both more af-
firmative and more essential. It evidenced the user's comprehension of
and devotion to the core of civilization itself... 72
65. Borrus et al., supra note 2, at 68. CD-ROMs that were selling for $100
a year ago are now selling for $6.50. Id. The drop in price corresponds to an
oversupply of pirated goods. Id.
66. Lee M. Sands & Deborah M. Lehr, Expanding Trade and Opening Mar-
kets in China, China Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1993, at 11. Chinese courts are un-
derstaffed and many judges lack the necessary background to rule on IP cases.
Tan Loke Khoon, Counter Feats: The Art of War Against Chinese Counterfeiters,
CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 14. This judicial inexperience often results
in poor implementation or misinterpretation of IP laws. Id.
67. Borrus et al., supra note 2, at 68.
68. Wineburg, supra note 56, at 21. Counterfeiting is often a source of in-
come for local officials and a source of jobs and investment for the community.
Khoon, supra note 66, at 15. China's designated copyright enforcement agency,
the NCA, is under-staffed, poorly funded, and hindered by its dependence on
local officials who often have little or no interest in enforcing IP laws. Derek
Dessler, China's Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving Inter-
national Standards, 19 FoRDHM INT'L L.J. 181, 231 (1995).
69. "[Plolitical culture comprises enduring values and practices central to a
nation's identity.. .". ALFORD, supra note 43, at 120.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 28-29.
PIRACY VIN CHINA
Because copying is a highly honored and accepted process in
China, the process of establishing an effective IP regime chal-
lenges certain traditional Chinese values.
China's views of IP rights are shaped not only by its political
culture but also by its status as a developing country. Develop-
ing nations often see Western IP rules as an effort by developed
nations to keep them impoverished, whereas developed nations
consider an IP regime that is not up to their standards to be
piracy.7 3 Furthermore, developing nations often claim a right to
the ideas and knowledge of developed nations because they be-
lieve developed nations have an obligation to assist them in
their efforts to modernize.7 4 In China,the reference to pirated
programs as "patriotic software," because the programs speed
China's modernization at little or no cost, illustrates this
conflict.75
C. THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Throughout the Uruguay Round of Negotiations of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States
lobbied for a multilateral IP agreement. While critics accuse the
United States of hampering the Uruguay Round, others assert
that the U.S. use of Special 301 increased the prospects for an
73. Chang, supra note 6, at 215.
74. Differences between the developed and the developing nations occur at
two levels-the economic level and the moral level. Economically, an IP regime
is undesirable because instituting, monitoring, and enforcing such a system re-
quires already scarce financial resources. Newby, supra note 19, at 51. From
the perspective of developing countries whose resources are already limited, the
idea of spending time and money developing products and processes that have
already been developed is absurd. Id. These arguments for the sharing of
knowledge are supported by the finding that strong IP laws do not necessarily
improve global efficiency. Butler, supra note 33, at 44 n.25 (citing Judith C.
Chin & Gene Grossman, Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade,
PRINCETON U. DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECON. 143 (Nov. 1988)).
The moral issues go beyond economics and consider the responsibilities of
developed nations with regard to the sustainment of human life. See Chaudbry
& Walsh, supra note 36, at 88. India's response to U.S. demands for patent
protection for pharmaceutical products exemplifies the moral differences. In-
dian officials rejected patent protection for pharmaceutical products because
they believed that in a country where many people lack access to basic health
care, the ability to make drugs and medicines should be in the public domain.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
75. James Cox, U.S. Firms: Piracy Thrives in China, USA TODAY, Aug. 23,
1995, at 2B.
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acceptable IP agreement.76 The Uruguay Round established the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which brought trade
in services, investment, and IP protection into the multilateral
system for the first time.77 The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) establishes an interna-
tional standard for the protection of IP rights for all members of
the WTO.7 s
TRIPs includes the traditional GATT requirements of na-
tional treatment and most favored nation and it incorporates
both the Paris and Berne Conventions. 79 It also includes:
[pirotection of computer programs as literary works; [riental rights for
computer programs and sound recordings; [flifty years of copyright
protection for sound recordings and motion pictures; [piroduct and pro-
cess patent protection for virtually all types of inventions; . . . and
[pirotection for trade secrets, integrated circuits, industrial designs,
and non-generic geographical indications used to describe wines and
spirits.
8 0
In addition, TRIPs requires access to civil and administrative
procedures and includes provisions on evidence of proof, injunc-
tive relief, payments for damages, and indemnification of parties
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.81
In terms of compliance, the agreement gives countries one
year from the date they enter the WTO to comply.8 2 Developing
countries are given an additional four years to comply and the
least developed countries are entitled to a ten-year phase-in pe-
riod.83 WTO members "are not required to provide pipeline pro-
76. Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual Property Pro-
tection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 492
(1994). After the United States initiated negotiations under Special 301, Brazil
agreed to the immediate implementation of TRIPs without regard to the transi-
tion period available to developing nations. Id.
77. The WTO: What It Is, What It Does, Focus (World Trade Organization,
Geneva, Switz.), Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 4.
78. Carlos A. Primo Braga, Protection On A Global Scale, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 25.
79. Doane, supra note 76, at 477. See supra notes 33, 47 (describing the
Paris and Berne Conventions).
80. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 5 U.S. DEPr. ST. DISPATCH
126 (1994).
81. Primo Braga, supra note 78, at 25.
82. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
33 I.L.M. 1197, in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C.
83. Id. at art. 65. Additional exceptions provide that a non-developing
country may qualify for the additional four year transition period if it "is in the
process of transformation from a centrally-planned into a market, free-enter-
prise economy and which is undertaking structural reform of its intellectual
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tection - retroactive protection of a subject matter already
patented in another member country and not yet marketed in
the country that will be assuming new obligations under
TRIPs"- during the transition period.8 4
Even though the United States signed TRIPs, it continues
to use Special 301.85 Foreign countries criticize the U.S. imple-
menting legislation for the Uruguay Round because it allows the
USTR to identify a country "for Special 301 treatment notwith-
standing its compliance with TRIPs."8 6 The danger of the
USTR's ability to continue to pressure developing nations with
regard to IP issues is that it may nullify the transitional ar-
rangements of TRIPs.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGY WITH
REGARD TO CHINA
In terms of economic clout, the United States appears well
positioned to establish an effective IP regime in China. China's
trade surplus with the United States was approximately $35 bil-
lion in 1995 and is expected to be around $50 billion in 1996.87
In addition, the United States is critical of China's acceptance
into the WTO.8 8 Despite its economic leverage, the United
States failed to pressure China into establishing an effective IP
regime. Rather than abide by the IP agreement that it signed
with the United States in 1995, China opened five additional CD
factories, boosting its production capacity to ninety million CDs
property system and facing special problems in the preparation and implemen-
tation of intellectual property laws and regulations." Id.
A developing country may qualify for an additional five year transition pe-
riod for specific technology areas that need to be protected under TRIPs, but
were not so protected on the general date of application. Id.
84. Primo Braga, supra note 78, at 27.
85. Doane, supra note 76, at 492. The multilateral system of the WTO is
designed to end annual threats of unilateral "Special 301" trade actions.
Chakravarthi Raghavan, Trade: Sutherland Says Bilateralism, Unilateralism
Undermines WTO, Inter Press Service, Apr. 25, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWSPLUS database.
86. Intellectual Property: GATT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic In-
tellectual Property Law, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 50 (Dec. 21, 1994).
87. Cooper & Brauchli, supra note 5, at A2.
88. Intellectual Property: U.S., China Announce Broad Agreement on Intel-
lectual Property Protection, 12 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 401 (Mar. 1, 1995).
"China is [currently] negotiating with a multilateral group of trading partners,
including the United States, in an effort to become a member of the World
Trade Organization." Id.
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in a domestic market that can only absorb five million CDs.8 9
Initially, the United States threatened to impose over $1 billion
in sanctions if China did not comply by February 26, 1996, the
one-year anniversary of the agreement.90 Since then, however,
the Clinton administration has pulled back from what was once
a firm deadline because it is wary of being too confrontational
with China. 91 The fact that an IP regime is not in China's inter-
ests and the politics of Sino-American relations explain much of
the failure of the current U.S. IP strategy.
A. AN EFFECTiVE IP REGIME IS NOT IN CHINA'S INTEREST
Unlike Taiwan, China is not at a point in its development
where protecting IP rights is in its best interests. Taiwan estab-
lished an effective IP regime because its "explosive economic ex-
pansion, increasing awareness of the need for indigenous
technology, ever-more-pluralistic political and intellectual life,
growing commitment to formal legal processes, and interna-
tional aspirations . . ." made the need for IP law evident.9 2 In
contrast, China remains a consumer of IP and is therefore un-
likely to see gains from the vigorous protection of IP rights.93
In general, an effective IP regime in developing countries
will increase the cost of living and make certain medicines unaf-
fordable.9 4 These costs are likely to be even greater in China
where the products and profits of piracy permeate so much of
Chinese society. The Chinese government is not only a major
user of pirated goods,95 but also a major producer of pirated
goods, such as video games and CDs. 96 In addition, some Chi-
89. Intellectual Property: U.S. Looking for Proof that China is Clamping
Down on Pirated Disks, 13 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 6 (Feb. 7, 1996).
90. Cooper & Brauchli, supra note 5, at A2.
91. Robert S. Greenberger, Chinese Moves Press U.S. Into a Corner, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 8, 1996, at A10 ("[the administration has] no deadline, but [it] won't
wait forever"). On February 21, 1996, USTR Mickey Kantor stated that his
office would need more time to decide whether to take retaliatory trade action.
Intellectual Property: U.S. Needs Time Before Determining China's Adherence to
Pact, USTR Says, 13 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 319 (Feb. 28, 1996).
92. ALFORD, supra note 43, at 108.
93. Chang, supra note 6, at 214.
94. Arthur Wineburg, U.S. Threats Spur Asian Laws on Intellectual Prop.
erty, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1992, at 29.
95. Forcing the Issue on Intellectual Piracy; Beijing Must Answer for
China's Failure to End Counterfeiting, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at 8. Reports
suggest that 90% of government offices use pirated U.S. software. Wineburg,
supra note 56, at 21.
96. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; Dessler, supra note 68, at
230. Most of the CD factories are cash cows for provincial governments, ruling
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nese villages depend completely on the production of pirated
goods for their livelihood. 97
In the past, China was responsive to U.S. demands because
the cost of enacting laws and joining international conventions
was low. Within a year of signing the 1992 MOU, China fulfilled
its obligations to join the Berne Convention and the Universal
Copyright Convention. 98 In addition, China amended its patent
law to protect products and processes and to extend the term of
protection from fifteen to twenty years. 99 But now that the
United States is demanding the enforcement of China's IP laws,
China may not be willing, or even able, to pay the cost of main-
taining an IP regime designed primarily to protect the IP of the
United States.100
Aside from the economic costs, China remains a country
that is largely indifferent to the concept of IP rights, which are
based on the ideas of individual recognition, ownership, and
profit. 01 Because these ideas are also the basis for democracy
and capitalism, IP rights are more readily accepted in the
United States than in China. 10 2 In fact, China's political culture
has traditionally considered copying a highly honored and ac-
cepted process. 10 3 Consequently, without further political liber-
alization and a greater "commitment to the institutions,
personnel, and values needed to undergird a rights-based legal-
ity, detailed refinements" in China's IP laws will be of limited
value. 104
The fact that India has established a more effective IP re-
gime than China, 10 5 but has also been embroiled in IP disputes
families or the army. Wallace Collins, Protecting U.S. Copyrights In China and
Elsewhere, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 31, 1995, at 5.
97. Farley & Gerstenzang, supra note 23, at Al. The local police have little
desire to shut down an illicit industry if the entire village depends on it. Id.
98. 1993 NTE, supra note 31, at 55. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text (explaining China's obligations under the MOU).
99. 1993 NTE, supra note 31, at 56.
100. Chang, supra note 6, at 222.
101. Paul Steidlmeier & Cecilia Falbe, International Disputes Over Intellec-
tual Property, 52 REV. Soc. ECON. 339, 349 (1994).
102. Id. at 346. Asian countries tend to emphasize the good and protection
of the larger society, as opposed to the individual. Jeffrey J. Blatt, Asian Tech
Transfers On the Rise, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Cl.
103. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (explaining China's polit-
ical culture).
104. ALFORD, supra note 43, at 120.
105. Intellectual Property: Indian Intellectual Property Issues Called Less
Problematic than China's, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 455 (Mar. 8, 1995).
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with the United States, 10 6 illustrates how economic costs and
political culture affect a country's interest. Even though India's
history of democracy and capitalism is much shorter than that of
the United States, 10 7 India is more Westernized than China,
and, as a result, the Indian public should be more familiar with
the ideas of individualism and ownership. In addition, India's
well developed pharmaceutical and software industries108 have
an economic interest in an effective IP regime. Nevertheless,
nationalistic forces in the Indian Parliament have undermined
India's attempt to effectively enforce its IP regime.
B. THE POLITICS OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
1. The Emptiness of U.S. Threats
China continues to play by its own rules, ignoring interna-
tional obligations such as the 1995 IP agreement, because it re-
alizes the emptiness of U.S. threats. The current high level of
trade between China and the United States, China's trade po-
tential, and cooperation in other international issues make sta-
ble Sino-American relations important to the United States. 0 9
China is expected to be the world's largest economy by the year
2010,110 with an estimated need to spend $750 billion to mod-
ernize over the next decade."' The United States is hesitant to
impose sanctions against China because China may respond by
becoming more hostile to the United States and by switching
from American to European and Japanese products.1 12 In the
future, the U.S. ability to use its economic influence over China
will only diminish as China's economy grows relative to the U.S.
economy.113
106. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
107. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 184-85 (1994).
108. Srikumar S. Rao, Yankee, Be Good: Lessons From the Front for Corpo-
rations Investing in India's Sputtering Economic Liberalization, FIN. WORLD,
Nov. 7, 1995, at 58 (describing India's growing software and pharmaceutical
industries).
109. Greenberger, supra note 91, at A10.
110. The Titan Stirs, ECONoMisT, Nov. 28, 1992, at S3 (calculations based on
figures from the World Bank).
111. Greenberger, supra note 91, at A10.
112. Paul Blustein & R. Jeffrey Smith, Economic, Political Concerns Put
Clinton on the Spot in China Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1996, at A26. In the
midst of the dispute over the President of Taiwan's visit to the United States,
China passed over Chrysler and Ford to became partners with Mercedes-Benz
in a $1 billion joint venture to build minivans and automobile engines in China.
Susan V. Lawrence et al., A Dangerous Face-Off. The Dire Consequences of
Fraying Relations with Beijing, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 24, 1995, at 27.
113. LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? 260 (1992).
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The credibility of U.S. threats are further diminished by the
risk averse nature of American politicians, who are highly sensi-
tive to American business interests. During the past few years,
China has grown from "just... a promising market" to a critical
one to American companies such as Motorola, AT&T, and Boe-
ing.114 Consequently, a major disruption in trade - or retalia-
tion by Beijing in the form of shunned deals would devastate the
American business community. 115 American firms would not
only lose market share, but they would also be at a competitive
disadvantage in the future. 116
American business interests are not oblivious to China's
poor human rights record or to its failure to protect IP rights,
but argue that "by operating in China, American companies con-
tribute to economic freedom and expand economic choices for the
Chinese people."117 In contrast, trade sanctions would create
tension and resentment toward the United States, leaving the
United States with less ability to influence China's behavior."l 8
U.S. dependence on China's cooperation in other foreign pol-
icy issues further diminish the credibility of U.S. threats. Re-
cently, the United States sought China's assistance in
persuading North Korea to accept light-water nuclear reactors
supplied by South Korea." 9 China also holds a crucial vote on
international arms control issues such as the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime
because it is one of the world's five declared nuclear powers. 120
114. Amy Borrus et al., Itching to Jab Beijing, Bus. Wa., Feb. 12, 1996, at
44; Lawrence et al., supra note 112, at 27.
115. Borrus et al., supra note 114, at 44.
116. Orrin G. Hatch, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in China, COM-
PUTER L. REP., Feb. 1993, at 67-68, reprinted in Special 301 and the Fight
Against Trade Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1993) [hereinafter
Hearings].
117. Greenberger, supra note 91, at A10 (conclusion of a report by the Busi-
ness Coalition for U.S.-China Trade).
118. Hearings, supra note 116, at 68.
119. R. Jeffrey Smith, China Nuclear Deal With Iran is Feared; U.S. Worries
Transfer Could Lead to Arms, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al. China is one of
North Korea's biggest trading partners and sources of hard currency. Steve
Glain, U.S. May Be Weighing a Response Short of Sanctions if North Korea Deal
Fails, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1995, at All.
120. U.S. Requests China's Help With North Korea; Beijing Asked to Break
Nuclear Pact Dispute, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1995, at A25. The Missile Technol-
ogy Control Regime is a multilateral accord that bars the transfer of certain
types of missile technology. Smith, supra note 119, at Al.
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2. The Constraints of Domestic Politics
Domestic politics often reduce the diplomatic options avail-
able to a country. For example, economic nationalists have hin-
dered India's ability to establish effective pharmaceutical and
chemical patent protection. 12 1 In the early 1990's, the Bhara-
tiya Janata Party (BJP), India's largest opposition party,
stepped up its campaign against foreign companies prompting
the cancellation of Enron's $2.8 billion power project and the
closing of several Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets. 122 The na-
tionalist sentiment made it easier, if not politically necessary,
for Indian officials to disregard U.S. threats.
In China, the uncertainty surrounding Deng Xiaoping's suc-
cessor limits the political options available to China's leaders. 123
Chinese officials, intent on preserving their control in the post-
Deng era, are under increasing pressure not to be perceived as
soft on anything, least of all foreign policy. 124 Consequently,
China is unlikely to compromise on IP issues and other more
sensitive issues such as Taiwan and human rights. 25
Ironically, China's strong stance against the United States
increases the pressure on President Clinton and the USTR to
take a strong stance against China. 126 The upcoming presiden-
tial election in the United States magnifies the Clinton adminis-
tration's need to strike a tough pose in its dealings with
China. 127 The political pressure is also a result of a Congres-
sional shift from free trade to economic nationalism and the ap-
parent failure of Clinton's policy of engagement, which has not
improved China's human rights or IP record.' 28 Congressional
121. India's WTO Patent Bill Fails in Parliament, Marketletter, Apr. 10,
1995, available in WESTLAW, MKTLTR database.
122. Mark Nicholson, Elections Cloud Investment in India: Opening the
Economy has Wide Support Despite Recent Events, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at
3; Rao, supra note 108, at 55. Interestingly, the BJP presents itself as an eco-
nomic nationalist and a liberaliser; its slogan is "India needs computer chips,
not potato chips." India's Economic Nationalists, ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 1995, at
28.
123. R. Jeffrey Smith, China Aids Pakistan Nuclear Program; Parts Ship-
ment Reported by C.I.A Could Jeopardize U.S. Trade Deals, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 1996, at Al.
124. Karsten Prager, Bulls in the China Shop, TIME, June 5, 1995, at 35.
125. Joyce Barnathan et al., International Business: China, Bus. Wy-, Jan.
15, 1996, at 44.
126. Cooper & Brauchil, supra note 5, at A2; Greenberger, supra note 91, at
A10.
127. Paul Blustein, Trade-Policing Unit Shows Clinton Shift, WASH. POST,
Jan. 6, 1996, at Dl.
128. Borrus et al., supra note 114, at 45.
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Republicans have already set the stage "for a nasty spring de-
bate over renewing [China's] Most Favored Nation trade
status."12
9
Further complicating the IP situation are recent concerns
about China's political and military efforts to influence the
March 23, 1996, elections in Taiwan and the alleged sales of nu-
clear and missile technology from China to Iran and Paki-
stan.130 If the allegations of arms sales are true, Clinton would
be under even greater pressure to impose economic sanctions,1 1
thus presenting another test of Clinton's willingness to impose
sanctions against China.' 3 2
III. AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR ESTABLISHING
AN EFFECTIVE IP REGIME IN CHINA
The refusal of Chinese government and business officials to
enforce IP laws is best explained by the fact that piracy of for-
eign products continues to be a source of profit.' 33 Conse-
quently, the United States needs to encourage China to develop
its own world class technologies. The proposed strategy entails
enlarging China's role in the world economy through member-
ship in the WTO-34 and the artful use of Special 301 to express
disapproval of foreign policies or practices that inadequately
protect IP rights.
A. CHINA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WTO
China is the eleventh largest trading nation, and its econ-
omy is expanding and modernizing at a remarkable pace. 135 Ac-
cession to the WTO would not only enlarge China's role in the
world economy, but it would also require compliance with
TRIPs. 13 6 The WTO has two distinct advantages over Special
129. Robert A. Manning, China Knocking; They Want to Enter the World
Economy, But Will They Play by the Rules?, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996, at C4.
130. Greenberger, supra note 91, at A10.
131. Id. "If the Clinton administration determines that China sold Pakistan
ring magnets, used in centrifuges that enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, a
1994 law would require the president to either cut off U.S. Export-Import Bank
loan guarantees" worth as much as $10 billion or waive such penalties. Id.
132. Id.
133. Butler, supra note 33, at 41.
134. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Consolidating Capitalism, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring
1995, at 62.
135. Russell Cheetham, Why We Need China to Succeed, WALL ST. J. ELtm,
Sept. 5, 1995, at 6; Forcing the Issue on Intellectual Piracy; Beijing Must An-
swer for China's Failure to End Counterfeiting, L.A. TMvis, Oct. 11, 1995, at B8.
136. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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301. First, instead of demanding immediate results, the WTO
allows developing countries up to five years to comply with
TRIPs. 13 7 Second, even though enforcement provisions of the
WTO are implemented bilaterally, the moral sanction of a multi-
lateral organization such as the WTO minimizes the risk of a
trade war and the associated costs to the United States. 138
China's application for accession to the WTO has been prob-
lematic. China's insistence on playing by its own rules raises
questions in Western minds about China's reliability and pre-
dictability as a trading partner. 139 In addition, China must ad-
dress concerns about access to its agriculture market and its
regulation of insurance, telecommunications, and financial serv-
ices before it can be accepted into the WTO.140 While the United
States should not absolve China from its responsibility to ad-
dress these issues, it should consider allowing China to accede to
the WTO as a developing nation or as a developed nation in the
process of transforming from a centrally-planned to a market
economy because either of these options would allow China addi-
tional time to establish an IP regime.141
While additional time, by itself, is unlikely to establish an
IP regime, Chinese officials have argued that a five-year time
frame would be more reasonable than the strict time frame of
Special 301.142 Even in the United States, where the constitu-
tion provides for the protection of IP rights 143 and where Con-
gress enacted specific copyright laws more than 100 years
ago,' 44 the effective enforcement of IP laws did not happen in-
stantaneously. For example, U.S. copyright laws were not effec-
tively enforced until a group of publishers filed a copyright-
infringement lawsuit against Kinko's in 1989.145
137. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
138. Knock, Knock: World Trade, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 72.
139. Forcing the Issue on Intellectual Piracy, supra note 135, at B8.
140. GAIT/ WTO: U.S.-China Talks Called Productive; More Talks on WTO
Accession are Set, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1961 (Nov. 29, 1995).
141. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142. Newby, supra note 19, at 44 ("Give us five years to end this problem. If
we can solve these problems in five years, then I think we will have done a good
job.-)
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
144. See 17 U.S.C.A., at VI (West 1977) (describing earlier copyright
legislation).
145. Rubin G. Blumenthal, Book Publishers Say Copier Chain Takes Too
Much for Free, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1989, at B9. The lawsuit concerned the use
of illegally photocopied portions of copyrighted materials as custom textbooks.
Meg Cox, Kinko's, Publishers Reach Settlement of Copyright Suit, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 1991, at B6.
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China's accession to the WTO as a developing nation will be
difficult. Opponents argue that the eleventh largest trading na-
tion must be accepted as a developed nation.1 46 However, a
country's ability to engage in international trade is not an accu-
rate indicator of whether a country is developed or develop-
ing.147 An accurate indicator needs to take into account the
population of a country. 48 Because China is the world's largest
country, population is an especially important factor in deter-
mining China's developmental status. A comparison of per cap-
ita Gross National Product (GNP) indicates that China's per
capita GNP of $490, is significantly smaller than the U.S. per
capita GNP of $23,120.149 Furthermore, the World Bank's de-
velopment diamond, which considers life expectancy, gross pri-
mary school enrollment, access to safe water, and GNP per
capita, shows that China's level of development is consistent
with other low-income countries. 50
The United States should offer to support China's accession
to the WTO, either as a developing nation or as a developed na-
tion in the process of transforming from a centrally-planned to a
market economy, if China closes some of its illicit CD factories
and agrees to comply with the necessary WTO requirements.1 51
Since China would not be exempted from any of the require-
ments that apply to other countries, this approach enlarges
China's role in the world economy without compromising the le-
gitimacy of the WTO.152 In conclusion, WTO membership pro-
vides China with additional time to establish an effective IP
regime, increases domestic support for IP rights by encouraging
China's economic development, and spreads the diplomatic costs
146. P.T. Bangsberg, China Says It Won't Jettison National Interests to Join
WTO, J. COM., May 16, 1995, at 3A, available in WESTLAW, JOC database.
147. See INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV. / WORLD BANK, SOCIAL
INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT viii (1994) (noting that none of the four key in-
dicators of the development diamond take trade into account).
148. See id. (recognizing that the World Bank uses GNP per capita in its
comparisons as opposed to GNP).
149. EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LIMITED, THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 805,
3161 (1995).
150. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV. / WORLD BANK, supra note
147, at 72.
151. "[Elven the least developed ... WTO member states have committed
themselves to liberalization of trade in services, restraint of subsidies and
addressing non-tariff barriers." Keith M. Rockwell, China: Stonewalling the
WTO, J. CoM., Oct. 27, 1995, at 6A, available in WESTLAW, JOC database.
152. Id. Allowing China into the WTO on its terms would set a very bad
precedent. Id.
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of establishing an effective IP regime in China among the mem-
ber nations of the WTO.
B. THE ARTFuL USE OF SPECIAL 301
The United States must also continue to use Special 301 to
express disapproval of foreign policies or practices that fail to
adequately protect IP rights. Special 301 is not suited to foster-
ing economic development, but it is an effective way to express
disapproval. The artful use of Special 301 requires "awareness
of the danger of abuse and the willingness to exercise self-re-
straint."153 The United States must balance the use of threats
of trade sanctions against the associated economic risks. 5 4
Up to this point, the United States has avoided a trade war
while successfully pressuring China to join the Berne Conven-
tion and to promulgate new IP laws. 155 The increased costs as-
sociated with enforcing these laws make it more likely that
China will stand up to threats of trade sanctions in the future.
Consequently, a symbolic role for Special 301 may be more ap-
propriate in regards to China.
While the artful use of Special 301 should be the long-term
U.S. policy, the present political situation with regard to China
precludes such an option. The USTR has already threatened
China with more than $1 billion in trade sanctions if China fails
to comply with the 1995 IP agreement.' 56 If the USTR were to
back down on such a specific threat, it would destroy the credi-
bility of Special 301.157
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. strategy of using economic influence to pressure
other countries is no longer an effective way to deal with China's
intellectual property (IP) problems. Special 301, the centerpiece
of the current U.S. IP strategy, is most effective when the per-
ceived costs of enacting or enforcing IP laws is low. However,
the cost to China of maintaining an IP regime designed primar-
ily to protect the IP of the United States may be quite high.
153. Chang, supra note 6, at 225.
154. Hearings, supra note 116, at 68.
155. See Newby, supra note 19, at 51 (describing how countries work to pro-
vide the United States with signs of progress that are seldom backed up by
enforcement).
156. Cooper & Brauchli, supra note 5, at A2.
157. Id.
524 [Vol. 5:503
1996] P.IRA C YIN CHINA 525
Because the United States can no longer flex its economic
muscle and expect China to comply with its demands, a new
strategy is required. In the future, the United States needs to
use Special 301 artfully to express its concerns about foreign pol-
icies or practices that fail to adequately protect IP rights. In ad-
dition, the United States should focus on encouraging
developing countries to innovate. Specifically, with regard to
China, the United States should make negotiating China's ac-
cession to the WTO as a developing nation a priority.

